Professor Sprague 1
Oliver Mitchell Wentworth Sprague was America's leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve. He was, literally, the man who "wrote the book" on financial crises. His History of Crises under the National Banking Act is the most enduring intellectual legacy of the National Monetary Commission; a still frequently cited classic. Since the Commission recommended a central bank, and its recommendation after some modifications became the Federal Reserve System, it might be assumed that Sprague was a strong supporter of establishing a central bank. But in fact Sprague was opposed to a European style central bank and supported more limited reforms. Sprague's views have often been ignored by historians of thought because he was not a theoretician like his contemporary Irving Fisher, or a successful businessman like investment banker Paul M. Warburg. But I think the neglect of Sprague is somewhat unfair, and I hope to redress the balance by re-examining his views on the need for a central bank. Sprague had an encyclopedic knowledge of the history and institutional structure of American banking in his day, and an examination of Sprague's views, I hope to show below, enhances our understanding of U.S. banking history prior to the Federal Reserve.
Sprague had written a series of papers in the early years of the twentieth century that established his reputation as one of America's experts on money and banking (Sprague 1900 (Sprague , 1903a (Sprague , 1903b (Sprague , 1908 . He had also edited and revised Charles F. (Dunbar and Sprague 1901) . So he was already one of America's leading experts on banking and banking crises when he was chosen to write the crucial volume on banking crises for He died in 1953. Cole, Masson, and Williams (1954) is a detailed obituary.
Dunbar's classic text, Chapters on the Theory and History of Banking

Warburg versus Sprague, 1908
Whether the United States should have a central bank was debated at the annual meetings of the American Economic Association held in Atlantic City in December 1908.
There were two papers: the first by Paul M. Warburg made the case for a European style central bank and the second by Sprague made the case against such a bank.
Warburg is widely regarded as one of the intellectual fathers of the Federal Reserve. (Mehrling 2002, 211-2 ).
An investment banker, his views had already received considerable attention. Perry Mehrling (2002, 211-2) Warburg suggested several reasons for adopting a European central bank, but the heart of his case was the contrast between the European and especially the German experience in 1907 and the American experience.
Expansion was probably more acute in Germany than with us; why then did Germany, much weaker than we, weather the storm without a panic, while we went into a most disgraceful state of utter helplessness and temporary bankruptcy? (Warburg 1909, 344) Warburg noted several factors that accounted for the difference, but the major difference, clearly, was the Reichsbank.
Furthermore, there was unimpaired confidence that so long as the Reichsbank was in general touch with the situation, though some things might be rotten, they would remain the exceptions; and that it would be impossible for all or even any large proportion of the financial institutions to be unsound (Warburg 1909, 344) Contrast that with the American experience in 1907.
Whatever causes may have combined in the United States to bring about the crisis of I907, it cannot be doubted that it would never have reached such appalling dimensions had it not been for the lack of elasticity in our currency; the utter uselessness of our reserves; our inability to apply the brakes while we were going too fast; the absence of any means to negotiate for measures of relief with other countries through a channel recognized by them as official; and finally the lack of modern American bills of exchange, which, while serving as the means of settling the daily balances of the nation, would have been assets on which the banks might have realized in Europe and in the United States, by rediscounting amongst each other or at a central bank (Warburg 1909, 345) .
What about Canada? Canada did not have a central bank, but it had also weathered the storm without a financial crisis. Warburg expressed some doubts about the comparison: -Canada, for example, had a population of six million and the United States a population of 85 million -but his main concern was political. The Canadian banking system was highly concentrated. Creating a highly concentrated system of large branch banking networks in the United States would mean creating a system that "popular sentiment abhors" (Warburg 1909, 355 ).
Warburg then went on to provide a detailed outline for a system of currency associations which would discount paper and pass the paper along to a "central issue department" in Washington that would issue notes. It was not a full blown central bank, it was something less. It would, however, supply an emergency currency. The details of how the system would work, need not detain us here. The point is that Warburg was the man with the plan.
The case against a European style central bank was made by Sprague (1909a) .
In the space available, Sprague was provided only an outline of his case against a European style central bank. Soon after, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Sprague (1909b) published a detailed exposition of his case. Here I draw on both papers to summarize Sprague's views. I should add, however, that the discussants of the Warburg and Sprague papers gave short shrift to Sprague's views in part perhaps because his paper lacked the detailed plan that Warburg's paper included.
Sprague thought that American conditions raised serious questions about how a European style central bank would function in ordinary times and that there were alternatives for dealing with financial panics. Two considerations weighed against establishing a European style central bank in the United States. The first was the geographical dispersion and fragmentation of the American banking system. Political pressures would inevitably force an American central bank to allocate its lending on the basis of population, and so force the Federal Reserve into the difficult although possible prospect of lending "fairly" to thousands of local banks. A central bank would have funds to lend because, if European precedent was followed, it would become the fiscal agent of the government and the U.S. was running persistent, although highly variable surpluses. At the time, the U.S. relied on its independent Treasury system, which, to some degree, simply locked away excess reserves. Simply requiring the Treasury to deposit its excess balances in National banks, Sprague thought, would be sufficient to solve this problem. As it turned out, the Federal Reserve Act adopted the system of regional reserve banks to ameliorate concerns about fairness in the allocation of loanable funds, thus addressing the political forces that Sprague identified.
A second problem with a European style central bank was the potential for inflation. A central bank would mean the issue of a new form of currency. The amount would be limited because of the tie to gold. It might be more appropriate to think of it as middle-powered money in contrast with bank deposits (low-powered money) and gold (high-powered money).
3 But it would be treated as a reserve by commercial banks and have the power to generate multiple increases in credit. Here is how Sprague (1909a, 362) expressed it at the annual meetings of the American Economic Association.
"By substituting the notes issued by a central bank for money now in circulation which could be counted as reserve, our banks could further enlarge the credit structure until checked by gold exports, unsound business conditions, and lack of confidence."
In his paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics Sprague (1909b, 386 ) was more explicit.
The conclusion would seem to be inevitable that with a highly developed deposit credit system the note of a central bank is a dangerous instrument, tending towards inflation.
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This danger would be especially acute, Sprague thought, during a period of excessive credit expansion preceding a financial panic. Optimistically, we might hope that a central bank would raise its discount rate, or take other actions, to limit the speculative boom.
3 This is not something I just invented. Although Friedman and Schwartz used a simple distinction between high-powered money and low-powered money in their basic money-supply formula, in appendix B of A Monetary History they (1963) developed models for the gold standard that treated central bank notes as middle-powered money. In order to use the simple high-low distinction they treated national bank notes during the national banking era as high-powered money because they were backed by federal government bonds and commercial bank deposits as low-powered money. Sprague (1909b, 398) Sprague (1909b, 387-8) , however, thought that the seasonal had a positive value because it "brings home to the banks the necessity of keeping their house in order at all times." In other words, he questioned one of the main reasons (from a political point of view) for establishing the Federal Reserve.
(2) As Sprague noted, the traditional theory of central banking, as developed by Bagehot in Lombard Street (1873) held that the central bank should meet financial panics by lending freely (to the market) at high rates. However, Bagehot was no longer the last word on central banking. Sprague believe that the British and American experience showed that a central bank could increase stability by conserving the assets of large banks that were in trouble, and whose failure might precipitate a financial panic.
Although Sprague did not feel that in practice a European style central bank was more likely to be successful than a clearing house. I will consider this issue in more detail below under the heading "bailouts."
(3) Finally, there is the problem of securing gold abroad during a financial panic.
As noted in the quote above Warburg thought that a major problem for the United
States requiring a central bank was "the absence of any means to negotiate for measures of relief with other countries through a channel recognized by them as official" (Warburg 1909, 345) . In other words, a U.S. central bank would be able to negotiate with foreign governments and central banks for a loan of gold during a threatened or actual panic. Sprague's answer was simply that the United States had never had any trouble securing gold from abroad. In 1907 $100,000,000 million had come in.
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What then was to be done? How could panics like the panic of 1907 be prevented? There were, Sprague suggested, several ways forward. One was simply to persuade the six largest New York banks, for practical purposes the holders of the bulk of the usable U.S. gold reserve, to act in concert during financial crises as the lender of last resort. As a result of their central position in the financial system, as a result of their wealth and power, they had a social responsibility to act in the public interest during an emergency. In this respect, Sprague's purpose was the same as Bagehot's in Lombard Street (1924 Street ( [1873 ). Bagehot thought that the Bank of England had acted appropriately in several past crises. But some leaders of the Bank of England still resisted the idea that the Bank of England had a social responsibility to use its reserves during a financial panic. Bagehot's purpose was to persuade the Bank to acknowledge its responsibility to act as lender of last resort; Sprague's purpose was to persuade the six largest New
York banks to acknowledge their responsibilities and act as lender of last resort.
Sprague, however, does not acknowledge the huge collective action problem raised by his policy that was not an issue for Bagehot, who had only to persuade one institution that was highly dependent on special grants of power to act in the public interest.
Sprague made a similar argument in a paper in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. This paper was then bundled with a paper by George Roberts, a banker, and published as a pamphlet by the Bankers Publishing Company (Roberts and Sprague, 1910 But combining the New York banks or persuading them to act in concert for the public good during an emergency were not the only ways forward. Sprague believed that there were several ways of providing emergency liquidity. An alternative was to provide for a temporary currency that banks could take out in an emergency in order to meet extraordinary demands for cash. This proposal was embodied in the Federal
Reserve Act in order to handle an emergency that might occur before the Federal
Reserve could be set up, the Act called for an emergency currency that could be taken out by individual banks and used to meet over the counter withdrawals, what became known as the Aldrich-Vreeland Currency.
What about Canada? Would it be possible to solve the problem of banking panics by allowing a system of nationwide branch banks to develop? Sprague did not address the issue in his response to Warburg. But we know that he was not on board. Sprague (1903b) had addressed the issue of branch banking. He did see many advantages of branch banking, but did not number preventing panics among them. And he saw some advantages in the local system of unit banks. In the end he compromised the two visions and recommended branch banking at the state level.
As noted above, two prominent academic economists, Horace White and Joseph French Johnson (1909) , discussed Warburg's and Sprague's papers. 6 In substance they were largely agreed. The chief problem of the American banking system was its fragmented structure in which small independent local banks played a large role.
The experience in Canada was very different from the U.S. and very instructive. Here is how White (1909, 372-3) put it "The wealth of Canada is much less than ours. Moreover, the wheat crop of Canada last year was in part frosted and under suspicion, while ours was sound. Yet Canadian bank credit was not shaken. The banks did not make runs on each other, therefore the public did not make runs on the banks. There are no country banks in Canada as we understand that term, only branches of thirty-five city banks, the heads of which are near enough to each other to secure unity of action."
But adoption of a Canadian style system in the United States, White argued, was by now politically impossible, the unit bankers were too powerful politically. European countries, however, had also avoided the banking crisis (although not the commercial 
Pooling Reserves
The basic structure of that argument is laid out in His conclusion seems to have been based on the timing of the intensification of the contraction (it came after the suspension), on the common sense understanding of the problems created by suspension (such as the inability to pay workers), and on the seemingly arbitrary play of events that characterized the decisions to suspend.
In most cases, suspension of legal tender payments meant suspension of gold payments. The one exception is 1873. In 1873 the United States was still on the Civil War greenback standard, so suspension meant banks were refusing to pay greenbacks over the counter. 10 In the 1930s there was no domestic suspension and Sprague attributed the severity of the contraction to non-monetary forces. But Sprague was adamantly opposed to the United States abandoning the traditional fixed price for gold, an analogous problem -suspension, or partial suspension, of international gold payments.
Next consider the famous clearing house loan certificates. These were issued during periods of financial distress when banks had trouble meeting obligations to other banks in legal tender. They were having trouble because they were paying out, or thought they soon might be paying out, legal tenders over the counter to depositors and noteholders. The clearing house to which a group of banks belonged would then issue certificates to its members in exchange for selected assets which they could use in lieu of legal tenders to clear their obligations to other members of the clearinghouse. The clearing house loan certificate is a fascinating example of private regulation of banking and as a result has received considerable attention from banking historians including Timberlake (1984) , Gorton (1985) , Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) , Moen and Tallman (2000, 2013) , and Jacobson and Tallman (2013).
Sprague thought that clearing house loan certificates were important and that they were one half of the solution to the problem of suspensions during periods of incipient panic or realized panic. They were only half the solution because they did not solve the problem of having to pay out legal tenders over the counter. True, a bank that had a deficit with other members of the clearing house could use the certificates to pay its debts to other banks, thus retaining more legal tenders to pay out to its customers.
But a bank that had a surplus was in the opposite position. It needed legal tenders, it was owed legal tenders, but it couldn't get them. It was only getting clearing house loan certificates.
Why couldn't a bank that was experiencing a run simply pay out clearing house loan certificates over the counter? In a few cases in the South and West this was done.
The local clearing house issued small denomination loan certificates which its members then paid out over the counter in lieu of gold. This solution, however, was never used, on a large scale. As far as I am aware, it was never used in New York. The problem was that what the public wanted was gold, greenbacks (because they were legal tender), or national bank notes (because they were backed more than 100% by federal government bonds) not a substitute. Sprague was opposed to the issue of small denomination loan certificates to the public. He thought they were "demoralizing!"
What could be done? The other half of the solution to the problem of banking panics was "pooling" or "equalizing" reserves. This meant an agreement among the banks that if one was running low on gold, the reserves of the other banks would be used to supplement the reserves of the bank that was running short. Pooling reserves reassured the public that their demands for gold would be met. In effect, once the agreement to pool reserves was reached the banks had turned themselves into a central bank. It was not, to be sure, like a modern central bank that could simply print legal tender, but it was analogous to a nineteenth century central bank that had a large gold reserve that it could deploy in an emergency.
What was the evidence that a combination of clearinghouse loan certificates and pooling reserves would work? Here, interestingly, the best evidence was not from the cases that were covered in the History of Crises under the National Banking System. By this plan the banks agreed that, for the purpose of enabling them to expand their loans, the specie reserves held by them should be treated as a common fund and, if necessary, should be equalized among the banks by assessments laid upon the stronger for the benefit of the weaker; and that, for the purpose of settling balances between the banks, a committee should be appointed with the power to issue certificates of deposit to any bank placing with them adequate security in the shape of stocks, bonds, or bills receivable, and that these certificates should be received in payment by creditor banks (Dunbar and Sprague 1901, 81) .
What was the effect of this agreement which was announced on November 21, 1860?
The effect of this arrangement was instantaneous. The announcement that it had been made quieted the money-market and ended the panic. In the next week the banks increased their loans rapidly, and nearly the whole of the additional loans went to swell the mass of deposits, with only an inconsiderable loss of specie (Dunbar and Sprague 1901, 82-3) .
The 1860 crisis, however, was unusual. There was no speculative bubble before the crisis. The economy had been doing well in the period leading up to Lincoln's election and the banks were in good shape (Dunbar 1904 , Swanson 1908a ). People were not questioning the basic solvency of the banks, or at least not questioning that the banks would have been solvent given normal political conditions. Rather, the problem was that southerners were withdrawing specie from New York banks while southern banks were refusing to honor sterling acceptances normally sold in New York.
This problem was faced by all of the New York banks, and there was no guarantee that the weaker banks would be hit harder. This made securing the cooperation of all of the New York banks easier than it normally was: Even the banks with strong balance sheets had an incentive to join the coalition. Sometimes the rational policy for the strongest individual is to flee and let devil take the hindmost; sometimes the rational policy is to join with others and circle the wagons. This was one of the latter cases.
This effect of this action, moreover, was to some degree confined to New York.
In the South, of course, the banks faced enormous challenges as Southern states The evidence from the crises that fell within Sprague's mandate told against pooling. In 1873 clearing house loan certificates and pooling of reserves were used, but there was still a suspension of legal tender payments and the economic contraction that followed was severe. Why didn't loan certificates plus pooling work? Here again Sprague's argument was adumbrated in Dunbar and Sprague (1901, 84-86 Sprague (1910d, 54) thought that suspension when it happened was "amply justified" by the low level reached by reserves when pooling was finally adopted. This is, of course, a matter of judgment. Elmus Wicker (2013) , after looking at the reserves of the New York banks, rejected Sprague's contention that the suspension was justified.
Sprague noted, however, that the suspension was not carried as far as in subsequent suspensions, perhaps because reserves had been pooled. Many depositor requests were honored. Indeed, Sprague (1910d, 55) claims that in 1873 "money continued to be paid out by the banks -indeed almost as freely as before." Nevertheless, the bottom line was that the loan-certificate-and-pooling policy had failed to prevent a panic and at least a partial restriction of payments. Sprague nevertheless praised the action of the New York Banks in his History.
During the continuance of the arrangement the banks were converted, to all intents and purposes, into a central bank, which, although without the power to issue notes, was in other respects more powerful than a European central bank, because it included virtually all the banking power of the city (Sprague 1910d, 90) .
And that was it: pooling was not used in subsequent crises, although half of the solution, the issue of clearing house loan certificates was used. Recalling the course of events in 1873 [when pooling was used], it cannot be questioned for a moment that suspension would not have occurred had similar action been taken in 1907, nor would agreement by all the clearing-house members have been necessary. The six large banks acting in concert could have sustained the local situation by making loans and at the same time could have supplied the demands of outside banks for money (Sprague 1910d, 273) .
Bailouts
Presumably reserves should be pooled so that banks that were rich in reserves could help banks that were running short. But what if the bank that was running short of reserves was insolvent? What if it was a very large bank with a superior reputation, so that its failure was bound to start or deepen a panic? Sprague never answered these questions in general terms. But it would appear from the cases that he examined that he thought that panics could be ameliorated by dispensing aid to specific firms, although the presumption would be that these firms would be illiquid rather than insolvent. As More recently still another method of relief has been adopted in practice, if not in theory.
Central banks have at times taken the lead, as in the Baring instance, in arrangements for the conservation of the assets of large banks which are not hopelessly insolvent, and by preventing sudden liquidation have confined the disturbance within narrow limits (Sprague 1909b, p. 401) .
And as noted above, Sprague thought that the Clearing House associations could manage this as well as a central bank. It should be added that the determination of the long-run solvency of a bank could be a difficult judgment to make in the middle of a panic. Clearly, we don't want to aid a bank that was "hopelessly insolvent." But this is a formulation which suggests a grey area. A bank might be worth aiding if it was in deep trouble.
Sprague, however, did not think that the ability to engage in this sort of deal making required a central bank.
In this matter the central bank has no very marked advantage over the clearinghouse organization in American cities. The machinery for united action will hardly be set in motion in the absence of some person of commanding influence in whom the business community has confidence (Sprague 1909b, 401) . I take this to mean that the leadership in 1890 in London came from the Bank of England, but that it might as easily come from some other quarter, say the president of a clearing house bank, or as I 1907, J.P. Morgan.
Sprague's positive American case for bank-specific aid was 1884 when the New York Clearing House aided the Metropolitan National Bank. The Metropolitan, a large New York bank, had suspended on Wednesday, May 14, 1884. The run was caused by the sudden fear that the bank's president, who was known to be a player on the stock exchange, had borrowed heavily from the bank or that the bank had loaned money to his favorites. Later, the Comptroller of the Currency was unwilling to write that evidence had been found to support the rumor, although the bank was under a regulatory cloud when the run began and had been prevented from issuing dividends when it suspended (Sprague 1910d, 348-9) . 12 The New York Clearing House sent a team to inspect the books of the Metropolitan, and decided that helping it was justified, partly because the Metropolitan was a large holder of interbank deposits and that its continued suspension might endanger the entire payments system. Clearing house loan certificates were issued, and the Metropolitan was able to resume the next day. Almost 30 percent of the $24.9 million in clearing house certificates taken out during the crisis were issued to the Metropolitan. Many of the other certificates were taken as a precautionary measure and not used. By July 1, 1884 all of the certificates were cancelled with the exception of some issued to the Metropolitan. Eventually, the bank went into voluntary liquidation.
Sprague believed that the issue of clearing house loan certificates, especially to the Metropolitan, had been "immediate and effective" in ending the panic and minimizing the damage (Sprague 1910d, 113 ). Knickerbocker. An unofficial committee representing banks and trust companies led by Benjamin Strong visited the Knickerbocker that evening, but no aid was forthcoming, and the next day a run forced the Knickerbocker to suspend. Sprague (1910d, 252) thought that if assistance was possible (if the Knickerbocker was not too far gone) and was provided that it was certain that "it would have been of advantage both to the banks and the other trust companies." Assistance was prevented, however, by the size of the bank -it would have been "an undertaking of no little difficulty" -by the lack of organization of the trust companies, and by the strained relations between the banks and the trust companies (Sprague 1908; 1910d, 251) . Subsequently, aid was arranged with the help of J.P. Morgan for the Trust Company of America and the Lincoln Trust Company when they experienced similar devastating runs. But in Sprague's judgment, this aid, although important in ending the crisis, had come too late to calm fears and prevent the breakdown of the payments mechanism. Thus, Sprague's conclusion was that aid to large institutions, today we might say systemically important institutions, was justified even if there were some questions about the ultimate soundness of the institution.
The Bottom Line
The central argument of Sprague's great book was that no fundamental changes in the banking institutions of the United States were needed to solve the problem of panics and suspensions. All that was necessary was that during incipient panics or at least at the start of a panic the large New York banks acted in concert in the public interest. They had done so on some occasions, but failed on others. In effect Sprague had cast himself as the American Bagehot. Just as Bagehot had set himself the task of persuading the Bank of England, a private bank, to act in the public interest during emergencies, Sprague had set himself the task of persuading the large New York banks to do likewise.
In the conclusion of the book, however, Sprague acknowledged that there were alternatives. There had to be a liquid reserve in New York, but there might be several ways of tapping it. He concluded somewhat vaguely as follows.
Provision for such a reserve power may doubtless be made in a number of different ways. This investigation will have served its purpose if in showing the causes and consequences of its absence in the past it brings home to the reader the need not only for this reserve power, but also of the readiness to use it in future emergencies (Sprague 1910d, 320) 
Sprague offers Plan B
Sprague adapted quickly to the changing political realities after the Panic of 1907, including what he recognized as a surprising degree of support for a central bank. 13 In a series of papers published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics Sprague (1909b Sprague ( , 1910a Sprague ( , 1910b Sprague ( , and 1910c was specific about what could be done in the way of improving the banking system and offered his plan for a central bank. 14 (1) National banks could be allowed to start savings departments that would invest in mortgages and issue time deposits to minimize the danger of runs. (2) The Comptroller of the Currency could be allowed to suspend the reserve requirements of the national banks, much as the British Bank Act could be suspended in an emergency to make more reserves available. (3) The national banks could shift from a bond based currency to an asset based currency. (4) A central bank would be a useful addition to the financial system if it could be structured so that its main function was to provide gold in emergencies.
The last point, of course, was a major concession for someone who had until quite recently opposed a central bank. Although Sprague was now willing to countenance a central bank he was still extremely skeptical about the wisdom of what he repeatedly identified as a European style central bank. Commercial banks, he still believed, were more likely to take excessive risks if there was a central bank on the scene, and this would especially be true in the United States with its myriad of small banks that in the aggregate exercised considerable political clout. He also thought that relying on the discount rate as a tool of monetary policy would be far more difficult in the United States than for example in England. Foreign rates were less closely tied to domestic rates in the United States, and a rate that might be appropriate in New York which was dealing with Europe would be inappropriate for the nation as a whole. The large interregional differences in rates within the United States posed a related problem.
The central bank lending rate appropriate for one region would be inappropriate for another. But political pressures would push the central bank toward a common rate.
The central bank that Sprague proposed, therefore, would not normally be in the market lending to commercial banks. Rather, it would be mainly a government While in normal times Sprague's bank would not be lending to banks, in emergencies, Sprague's bank would make advances to banks "whose reserves had been depleted" (Sprague 1910c, 79) . This would help to calm panics. Since the lending would be restricted to banks that were at the end of their tether, there was no room here for lending that would support growth of the money supply. Monetary policy would be left to the gold standard.
A look at the initial balance sheet Sprague constructed for his bank will further clarify his proposal. Source and Notes: Sprague (1910c, 93) . Sprague made a small numerical error in computing the gold reserves of his bank which I have corrected here.
Commercial banks would make deposits of ($75 million) in the central bank so that they could use it to settle interbank deficits, replacing the clearing houses. Gold certificates and U.S. notes (greenbacks) would be retired and replaced by notes issued by 
The Crisis of 1914
The crisis of 1914 provided a test for the emergency currency that had been included in the Federal Reserve Act and had been advocated earlier by Sprague. The AldrichVreeland Act passed on May 30, 1908 provided, as a stop gap measure, for an emergency currency. This provision was initially scheduled to expire on June 30, 1914, but the expiration date was extended, fortunately as it turned out, to provide protection for the banking system until the new Federal Reserve System was in operation. The emergency currency provision was complicated. The basic idea was that ten or more national banks could form a National Currency Association to issue members of the Association a currency that they could pay to note holders and depositors in lieu of legal tender. To receive the notes the banks had to deposit commercial paper or approved state and local securities. The amount of notes that could be taken out was a fraction of the assets deposited, the fraction varying with the class of asset. In order to encourage retirement of the notes after the emergency, the banks were subject to additional taxes based on the amount of currency outstanding. The Aldrich-Vreeland notes were similar to national bank notes. They were not necessarily backed by federal government bonds as the national bank notes were, but on the other hand, they were issued by a group of banks rather than one individual bank.
The outbreak of World War I led in short order to the deployment of the AldrichVreeland Currency. Perhaps the biggest immediate problem created by the outbreak of the war was the sale of securities on the stock exchange as foreign and perhaps domestic holders of securities tried to turn stocks into gold. The stock market was closed, as it had been in 1873, although as it turned out for three months rather than 10 days as in 1873.
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They were put into circulation as soon as the threat of runs on the banks developed. At their maximum $364 million were in circulation which was nearly onequarter of the currency in the hands of the public before the outbreak of the war (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 172) .
Sprague was pleased with the result.
Thanks to the emergency notes, the banks were able to maintain payments without difficulty, both over the counter and between themselves. All requirements for currency for use outside the banks were met with the new notes, thus safeguarding the reserves of the banks. The notes also were a positive means of increasing reserves. Gold, gold certificates and other lawful money received by the banks over the counter in the ordinary course of business were retained, while counter payments were regularly made in the new notes, which proved in every way quite as acceptable, indeed, in one respect more so, since they were all new currency (Sprague 1915, 519) .
Indeed, Sprague thought that things had gone better than in previous crises because bank lending was not adversely affected by the crisis to the same degree that it had been in earlier crises.
In some ways the situation in suggested a number of changes in the law that it would make it more acceptable to western, southern and small bank interests, and hence increase its chance of adoption.
At the annual meetings of the American Economic Association in 1912 Edwin Kemmerer (1913) presented a plan for improving on the Aldrich plan, and a number of economists including Sprague were asked to comment on Kemmerer's paper (Hollander, et. al. 1913) . On this occasion Sprague simply suggested a way of tying the new institution's hands: Loans should be limited to 25 percent of reserves (Sprague 1913, 70) . In that way, the inflationary dangers that Sprague foresaw could be avoided.
If the total amount of bank loans was increased too much the result would be a disaster because business would begin to rely on short-term loans in circumstances when long- Sprague was on sounder ground, I believe, when he endorsed the idea of "reserve power" in the central money market as the key to preventing suspensions.
Indeed, it would appear that the Aldrich-Vreeland currency, which Sprague (1915) thought had worked well, was precisely the sort of reserve power that he had been calling for. Again, the evidence is limited to one example, and one in unusual political circumstances, analogous to 1860. But there does seem to be a consensus that the Aldrich-Vreeland currency had worked well. Dodge (1922) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 171-3) , Wicker (2005, 47-49) , Silber (2007a; 2007b, 66-85) , and Jacobson and Tallman (2013) all agree with Sprague on the effectiveness of the Aldrich-Vreeland currency. 16 Indeed, Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 172) argued that the use of the 
